In one of countless discussions about philosophy that I have held with a good friend of mine (who is not, however, a professional philosopher), he surprised me with an insightful remark. He said something like the following: "How is it that philosophical anthropology never stands at the centre of intellectual debates where 'big philosophical issues' like the question of being, knowledge or morality are concerned?" At that moment it was not easy to find a prompt answer, but if we try to recall the development of philosophy throughout the centuries, we can figure it out. It is very likely that the source of the Western slight disregard for things human may be found in philosophers' effort not to become "human all to human", as Nietzsche would put it. Philosophy is simply the search for the eternal and enduring.
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In this respect, pragmatism also has much to say about philosophy. In contrast to the majority of philosophical approaches, pragmatism has always taken the human, perishable point of departure even when talking about the most perennial issues we can think of. Moreover, it should be pointed out that when we look at the theoretical basis of the work of all the major figures of pragmatism (James, Dewey, Rorty) there is a considerable amount of philosophical anthropology. The new book by J. Jeremy Wisnewski also does justice to this approach. His main goal is not to present another concept of "human nature", but rather to provide the reader with a methodological approach to a whole series of philosophical issues. According to Wisnewski, the key to dealing with philosophical (thus mostly axiological) questions is to be found in a proper view of human agency. This approach is also widely known in hermeneutics or phenomenology, for example, yet there are several reasons for us to think that Wisnewski's pragmatist approach provides more conceptual tools for an appropriate examination of human agency. We will examine these reasons later on.
Wisnewski's work is divided into six chapters. The first presents the author's conceptual basis, along with a rigorous explanation of why he preferred this method of dealing with certain problems to others. At this point, Wisnewski presents sound conceptual analyses and clear argumentation. This user-friendly method of writing philosophical treatises (if done well) unquestionably advances the author's credibility in the eye of the reader. In the first chapter, Wisnewski raises the presumption that the normative model of human agency that he is going to advocate is in many aspects superior to other major approaches to the investigation of human action (naturalism, humanism, and critical theory). The next two chapters are reserved for dealing with these last schools of thought. More precisely, in the second chapter, Wisnewski tries to engage in conversation with humanism and naturalism. Some important related arguments raised by Charles Taylor and Christine M. Korsgaard are examined as well. It has to be admitted, however, that Wisnewski proceeds quite quickly and it takes some effort to keep up with him in some parts of the text. The third chapter is a logical continuation of the previous one. It explores the author's belief that it is not only necessary to be able to understand and explain the main traits of human agency, but also to make them the subject of analysis and critique. The fourth chapter is devoted to an analysis of the competing notions of self, namely-atomistic, and dialogical. The role society plays in the shaping of our identities is also closely examined. Chapter five presents the reader with some problematic issues in the inquiry into human agency in general and also paves the way for the final conclusions in chapter six. Here, Wisnewski besides including the content of the book confronts his own findings with ideas found in the work of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Rorty.
It is always useful when an author starts his exposition with a clear explanation of what is to be done in the course of the text and the conceptual means needed in order to achieve it. This is exactly what Wisnewski does in the first chapter of his book. First of all, Wisnewski sets out his goal as an attempt to come up with a somehow alternative notion of philosophical anthropology. The traditional way of investigating the human condition in philosophical terms as thinkers such as Marcel, Heidegger or Sartre have done is to sketch something like an "ontology of the human situation" and study it from a metaphysical point of view. This method, however attractive it may look at first glance, bears too many disadvantages. The biggest one is that it does not allow us to critically evaluate our own conceptual assumptions. If we adopt any kind of metaphysical method, we run the risk of eventually finding ourselves in a closed universe of our own conceptual constructions not being able to share it with anybody outside it. Wisnewski, a thinker apparently closer to the analytic rather than the continental tradition, takes the opposite stance and proposes a semantic shift in this issue. Instead of asking "What is a human being?" he presents us with an alternative question, i.e. "What does it mean to be a human being?" By putting it like this, Wisnewski undoubtedly hints at the kind of outcome he is going to come up with in the second part of the book. What he is basically trying to answer is: "What is the nature of human agency and what conclusions are we to draw from it?" It is clear that Wisnewski's goal is not to sketch a strong theory of human agency, quite the opposite-Wisniewski wants to examine what the idiosyncrasies of human action are and what the consequences of his findings in the field of political and social philosophy are.
In order to do that, the author chooses analytical terminology to address most of the issues in the book. Wisnewski begins by distinguishing between three different ways of using asertoric speech acts, arguing that whenever we say something about the world, language or values, we necessarily use one of those. The first type is an assertion. This type of statement is meant to express knowledge about the empirical world. When we say that there are over 7 billion people in the world, we have the basic means to prove whether this statement is true or false. Assertions are thus statements about objective reality. The second group of statements is called clarification. We can define this by saying that clarification is the articulation of constitutive rules of practice. Clarifications often take the form of "x counts as y". For instance, when we play chess, we must obey a series of rules to guide us through the game, saying when it starts, how it proceeds, and finally-how it actually ends. In order to make sense of what Wisnewski is saying, we can use Searle's concept of epistemological/ontological subjectivity/objectivity: while assertions can be considered to be both epistemologically and ontologically objective, clarifications are epistemologically objective but ontologically subjective. In short, there is nothing ontologically necessary in the chess game rules; it is what it is because we agreed on this particular series of rules and not on any other. Thus, the truth value of this type of speech act does not lie in objective reality but rather in our practice of observing the rules constituting its value for doing things. The third kind of speech act, called recommendations, is in many ways similar to the previous one. It could take the following form: "A fetus is a human being." Regardless, we can see a difference here. While clarifications are adopted with little problem by each chess player, qualified car driver or language speaker in the world, recommendations are not. The intersubjective agreement about the constitutive rules of our practice is missing here. Both clarifications and recommendations are non-empirical statements; the truth value of them does not depend on our investigation of empirical reality. Unlike clarifications, recommendations tell us that "x should count as y", in other words they represent potential constitutive rules of practice, but have not yet achieved the vast intersubjective agreement of clarifications. It is my impression, that through the abovementioned distinction Wisnewski pursues at least two aims: a) the first could be called analytic-he wants the reader to notice a quite obvious fact, that is nonetheless often neglected in philosophical discussions, namely, that not all speech acts that take the form of asertoric statements about objective reality are really of this kind. And b) if all the constitutive rules of our practice are at best "only" epistemologically objective, they are subject to change and can be altered.
We can see, that it is the latter kind of practice that is going to be at the centre of our attention. Human agency necessarily has the social conditions and the constitutive rules are formed within this social nexus. As Wisnewski accurately mentions, their shape itself is not of importance at all. If the formation of the human self takes place within a social matrix that is subject to possible changes, we can see at the same time that this fact gives us a great opportunity for social reconstruction.
As mentioned above, in his book the author seeks to demonstrate that traditional approaches to the investigation of human agency fall short of providing a plausible account of the role normativity plays in human (not only moral) conduct. Wisnewski holds that the two traditionally opposed human agency schools, i.e. humanism (defending the idea, that in dealing with human agency it is necessary to take into account not only empirical facts but also the phenomenological dimension of experience) on the one hand, and naturalism (represented by various forms of materialism and eliminativism) on the other, do not provide sufficient conceptual tools to deal with this issue comprehensively. To prove this, Wisnewski chose two representatives of the humanistic side of the debate (Charles Taylor and Christine Korsgaard) and an advocate of the naturalistic position (Paul Churchland). Though Wisnewski's own position is clearly very close to that taken by humanism, he does not accept its ideas uncritically. After briefly outlining Taylor's transcendental argument of moral agency and strong evaluations, he eventually finds that although Taylor makes some very insightful and important points about the qualitative dimension of human agency, he starts his investigation somewhere in the middle and cannot do justice to the whole complexity of the issue in question. Wisnewski is probably right-Taylor's position, placing the notion of strong evaluations at the very centre of human nature is not only empirically highly implausible, but neither can it coherently explain human conduct.
In many respects, Korsgaard proceeds along the path set by Taylor. She also places ethics and the moral side of conduct at the very core of human nature and holds that ethical standards not only control our conduct but at the same time constitute our sense of who we actually are. Ethical standards are normative: they describe the way we regulate our conduct; recommend and force ourselves to do many things etc. Our reasons express our identity, our nature. In the same way, our obligations arise out of the practical identities we maintain in our everyday lives. This is also the way we perceive others-as practical identities. As Wisnewski shows, Taylor and Korsgaard have managed to show the important constitutive relation between the concept of human identity, moral agency and personhood in their texts (apart from many other important ideas of course). Persons are people with identities-who have a sense of themselves oriented in normative space and who make sense of their lives through the commitments they have.
In his critique of Paul Churchland, Wisnewski outlines two basic arguments. The first is rather traditional (but certainly not outdated) and states that any kind of robust naturalism (like eliminativism or materialism) cannot comprehensively and convincingly explain the qualitative dimension of experience, and moreover it faces serious difficulties in giving us a plausible account of the role values play in our lives. The second criticism lies in the fact that Churchland's eliminativism can be applied only to the descriptive investigation of experience. The prescriptive (normative) realm remains completely untouched by these efforts.
Apparently, Wisnewski's main intention here is not to decide which of the two abovementioned approaches is more accurate. Quite the opposite, I believe that he is trying to show the reader that the humanistic as well as the naturalistic solution to the question of human agency should not be considered as a clash of ideas that can be resolved by empirical investigation, but more as a clash of recommendations about which way is more appropriate (or fruitful) if we want to talk about human agency. Up to this point it is quite obvious that Wisnewski has still not revealed his own position. By setting two major philosophical schools of human agency against each other he wants to clear the way for his own solution. Nevertheless, if we look at his achievements so far, we can say that Wisnewski repeatedly calls attention to the fact that although humanism, naturalism and possibly many other approaches give the impression that the antinomy between them can actually be resolved empirically, they are all wrong.
If we want to examine agency thoroughly, Wisnewski says, we cannot stop at the descriptive level only. Unfortunately, that is exactly what the various forms of humanism and naturalism do. This is the reason why Wisnewski turns his attention to critical theory.
Not only has critical theory been vastly influential in 20 th century social thought, but it has also introduced a great number of new insights into the investigation of human agency. The need for a critical approach to this issue is undoubtedly one of the major ones. If we want to come up with a plausible account of agency, we must go under it and investigate the conditions of its origin that are not detectable in the individual mind or behavior. Over the decades, critical theory has done a great job of showing us how our seemingly natural values or social institutions are shaped by economic powers. Although Wisnewski apparently recognizes the contribution of this school of thought-he nevertheless addresses at least two problems in critical theory. The first one (addressed in chapter three with great clarity) is the metaphysical burden critical theory carries within its analyses. We may notice that the critical theory method resembles that of psychoanalysis in many respects (which taking into consideration the history of 20 th century philosophy comes as no surprise). Both methods are hermeneutic, their aims are emancipatory and the proof is in the proverbial pudding. Their key concepts (ideology, illusion, etc.) have been problematic ever since. Yet the goal of both is to set us free with the peculiar help of these concepts. In accordance with his pragmatist approach Wisnewski asks: why should we bother to speak of illusion or ideology at all? Is it not the case that these concepts are just as illusionary as the ones that they aspire to cure? Would it not be more appropriate to replace expressions like: "You suffer from an illusion spawned from a frozen understanding generated by capitalism" with "You wouldn't have these problems if you didn't understand x in that manner"? In Rortyian style, Wisnewski takes a typically pragmatist step here to show that, in this respect, critical theory is not the way to proceed-it is, at best, a recommendation of the way we could think of agency, but does not offer any real insight into its idiosyncrasies. We can see here that what is important in revising our actions is not to change our outlook or anything like that, but simply to change the constitutive rules of action. What does that mean exactly? To change the constitutive rules is to change the operative rules of what we take to be real. More precisely, it is to change one half of the equation "x counts as y". Thus, Wisnewski wants to make us see that the rules are to be considered as mere recommendations.
At this point it becomes clear that the therapeutic dimension of his work is going to be built on recommendations, not on strong metaphysical arguments-thus its validity lies in our willingness to accept it. As far as I am concerned, there is one flaw in Wisnewski's treatment of rules. Although he often likes to deal with some of the well-known problems like the fact that our behavior is always placed and formed within a wider social matrix, he barely touches on the problem of rule-following itself. This is even more surprising when we realize that the concept of normativity is one of the central concepts in the book. The problem of rule-following and normativity, stated but not sufficiently resolved in the late Wittgenstein, has been subject to countless lively debates and solutions (one by Habermas, which has its roots in G. H. Mead's pragmatism, is especially suggestive). It is my impression that these two problems need to be addressed if anyone wants to produce a comprehensive treatment of human agency.
Up to this point, it seems to the reader that the author approaches his subject in circles in which the themes of his work are constantly re-examined from very similar angles, sometimes without any visible progress to the heart of the matter. On the other hand, Wisnewski apparently wants to state his position clearly and wants the reader to re-think some deeply ingrained thought patterns.
In the fourth chapter, Wisnewski begins to unfold his own position. In a Kantian manner he asks: "What are the conditions for the emergence of human agency as we know it?" His general answer to this question lies in the notion of the dialogical self, i.e. in viewing the self as a product of socializing practices, which emerges in the course of human life. The self can be seen either relationally or atomistically. It should be pointed out that both of these approaches have significant implications for when we go on to discuss issues in political philosophy. Wisnewski is clearly aware of this fact. The atomistic position has always been strongly defended by followers of political liberalism. If we examine the atomistic view of human self in political philosophy, we notice that it basically has two sources: a historical and a metaphysical one. Whilst the historical one was extremely important over the past few centuries (because of its legitimization of numerous processes of significant political and social transformation), the metaphysical one has caused more problems than it could ever solve, mostly in political philosophy and philosophical anthropology.
Fortunately, in the 20th century the metaphysical foundations of the atomistic view weakened considerably. It became clear that it neglects what Wisnewski calls "the developmental thesis"-that the capacities endorsed by the atomistic view of the self are capacities which must be developed within a cultural context-through interaction with others, training and socialization. Through the pages of the fourth chapter, Wisnewski apparently does not want to philosophically prove that atomism is completely wrong, for sometimes it can serve certain heuristic purposes well. Besides, the position he defends here is the relational one. There are plenty of reasons (either empirical or non-empirical) for why the dialogical notion of self should be adopted. Apart from numerous findings of developmental and social psychologists, the strongest reason here is probably political. Wisnewski clearly does not deny his motivation here. If our institutions, laws, identities etc., are basically a product of society, they are subject to transformation. They can be continually reconstructed and replaced with ones that better serve our purposes. Thus, we are not Cartesian subjects, passively watching the world from our unique epistemic position, but we actively engage in both the natural and social worlds. We are dialogical because our identity is not possible without interaction with other human beings but we are also dialogical because the significance of our actions consists in participating in the shared understanding of the social world-we only understand it because we see it through public eyes.
What, then, is meaningful human activity? According to Wisnewski, to engage in meaningful human activity is to participate in the shared understanding of that particular activity which is constitutive of it. Here Wisnewski is making a point similar to that made by Peter Winch. Winch (as well as the late Wittgenstein) says that for an activity to be meaningful, it must become a social activity governed by socially controllable sets of rules. With this remark Wisnewski is referring to the very first chapter of his book, where he introduced the concept of constitutive rules, i.e. the kinds of rules that inform the "counts as" relation. Buying bread, voting in elections etc., thus involve not only thinking that we are doing it, but really doing it, that is-doing it as it is done (following a socially controllable set of rules). Here we can agree with Wisnewski almost entirely.
What does appear to be quite problematic is his other suggestion. Wisnewski holds that the abovementioned description is hardly thinkable without what he calls the phenomenological requirement. Our meaningful action involves a phenomenological dimension where a certain behavior "p" could not exist without those participants in "p" maintaining a shared understanding of what counts as "p". The phenomenological requirement is thus something like Searle's "we intentions" that coordinate our activities and make them possible. In order to participate in meaningful activity we must "feel the activity" regardless of what that means. Unfortunately, in spite of the author's efforts, the term "phenomenological requirement" remains largely obscure. It is not clear how the reader is to understand it. We can easily think of a counterexample to what Wisnewski or Searle say: let us think of animals, monkeys for instance. It is scientifically proven that monkeys can collectively engage in qualitatively new sets of practices (thus not only instinctual ones). Once one member learns how to do a certain thing, the rest of the group quickly join him in carrying out the activity. There is no doubt that to monkeys this new activity soon becomes meaningful, after some time it becomes regular and what is more, it is done clearly by following certain set of rules. Now what exactly does the fact that for human activity to become meaningful there must be some phenomenological requirement involved mean? Or are we to think that monkeys also possess the ability to adopt the phenomenological requirement? If so, then what is the exact nature of meaningful human activity? The author is quite unclear at this point.
All through his book, Wisnewski thoroughly analyses various aspects of human action and identity. All that he wants to say can be found mainly in the first half of his book. This is why the last chapter is devoted mainly to concluding remarks as well as to addressing some problematic issues concerning human agency in general. Surprisingly, Wisnewski does not come up with a theory of agency at all, and has a reason for not doing so. According to him, the most serious problem in providing a comprehensive account or theory of human agency is the social nature of it. The author makes it absolutely clear that theories of human agency cannot take the form of asertoric propositions about reality. There is nothing in the humanindependent reality that our assertions could match or even correspond to. This fact arises from the narrative (interpretive) nature of human identity. What we can say with certainty is that the human being is a flexible animal-self-interpreting through and through. Thus our behaviour represents what we think we are, not what we have to be. We cannot think of theories of human agency in terms of true/false categories. Rather, they should be seen as recommendations as to how we should think of them. Theories are parts of who we are, and our shared understanding is the root of normativity. A therapeutic or pragmatic reading of theories of agency lies in viewing theories of agency as attempts to allow us to understand ourselves in new ways, and via such understanding, to potentially change who we in fact are. It should be noted that although we can agree with Wisnewski at this point, many things remain untouched in his treatment. For instance, the question of language and communication is left completely aside. In the eyes of many philosophers and scientists it is the unprecedented ability to use signs that is unique to human agency. Indeed, without quite sophisticated communicational abilities even some very simple human institutions would be unthinkable. Although Wisnewski does discuss these matters now and again, he never manages to get to the heart of the matter.
The notion of human nature as being interpretive and plastic has its pros and cons. One of the disadvantages of this approach is that we will probably never find out who we are in the proper sense of the word. The positive side, on the other hand, lies in the fact that although we will never know who we are, we can still try to improve our nature. Our identities are not cut in stone; owing to this we can approach theoretical constructs as potential moral sources, as a means by which we might be capable of becoming better people.
The final pages of his book are devoted to an attempt to show what such an endeavour might entail. Wisnewski chose three major figures in the history of philosophy who became well known for trying to transform philosophy from hard science into a therapeutic activity-Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty.
The example of Friedrich Nietzsche is exemplary in many respects. Nietzsche was a philosopher who was deeply aware of the social problems of his time, but paradoxically enough he always disdained community. He was an elitist and individualist who rejected the notion of a communal project of self-overcoming, even though he was aware (more so than the majority of philosophers of his age) of the social nature of human beings. In contrast to Nietzsche, Wisnewski suggests that if we want to approach theories therapeutically, it is best to construe them as a communal project.
The second approach to taking philosophy and its theories as therapy is that of Michel Foucault. Although Foucault did much to uncover the structures of power hidden under the surface of many social institutions, his stance remains almost entirely negative. Wisnewski holds that Foucault had always been reluctant to admit that power empowers, i.e. it creates possibilities we might actualize. If we manage to uncloak the power structures, we might well be able to use them for our benefit and change society as we change ourselves.
The sharp separation of the private and public sphere in the work of Richard Rorty is Wisnewski's last aim. This great divide seems to make Rorty insensitive to the role that public articulation plays in shaping our individual endeavors. In some respects Rorty's position evokes that of Foucault-Rorty overestimates the role of private self-creation, and seems to give too little regard to what social philosophy might yet accomplish.
Taking J. Jeremy Wisnewski's book as a whole it is not easy to express a definite judgement. What seems to be certain is that Wisnewski could have been more ambitious in his pursuits. He undoubtedly has the ability to complete his discussion in the book by providing the reader with many insightful substantive suggestions concerning inquiry into human action, yet his attempts to do so are quite unsure and incomplete. This fact is especially obvious in the second half of his work. In the first half, Wisnewski impresses the reader with his clear presentation of conceptual means, by setting an attainable goal and providing sound argumentation. Unfortunately, in the second part, Wisnewski's solid fundamentals, set out in the first three chapters, seem to remain unexploited. On the other hand, it would be highly unfair just to criticize his work. Jeremy Wisnewski's book is certainly worth reading especially because it should be seen as an inspiring contribution to the discussion about various views on human agency. Does the book present a pragmatist solution to this discussion as the author declares at the beginning? In part, it certainly does. It tells us that we should not consider theories of human agency to be a kind of ontologically founded theory but just as recommendations on how we might think of ourselves. If we manage to do so, we will be able to use them as worthwhile tools for the improvement of society as well as for ourselves. This remark is in many respects liberating, and that is exactly what Wisnewski intended to do-seen from this perspective, we can consider his mission to be successfully accomplished.
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